[ 趙慶慶譯 ]——(2005-2-27) / 已閱53059次
Several years ago, the Questar Corp., which operated the only pipeline transporting natural gas to Salt Lake city, tried to acquire a major part of a firm that was planning to begin service to the city. The potential entrant was already having a procompetitive effect on pricing. The FTC blocked the merger, preserving the price benefits for Salt Lake City consumers.
多年前，Questar公司是唯一一家運營通往鹽湖城的輸氣管線的公司。它企圖獲取另外一家正計劃在鹽湖城提供類似服務(wù)的公司的多數(shù)股份。The potential entrant was already having a procompetitive effect on pricing. 聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會阻止了此項合并，維持了有利于鹽湖城的消費者的價格水平。
Price Discrimination
價格岐視
A seller charging competing buyers different prices for the same "commodity" or discriminating in the provision of "allowances" -- compensation for advertising and other services -- may be violating the Robinson-Patman Act. This kind of price discrimination may hurt competition by giving favored customers an edge in the market that has nothing to do with the superior efficiency of those customers. However, price discriminations generally are lawful, particularly if they reflect the different costs of dealing with different buyers or result from a seller’s attempts to meet a competitor’s prices or services.
一銷售商就相同的商品向不同的競買者索取不同的價格或在限量供應(yīng)（如對廣告或其它服務(wù)的補償）中對購買者實行歧視的行為可能違反《魯賓遜-帕特曼法》。這種價格歧視可能使某些受到優(yōu)待的消費者在市場中處于優(yōu)勢地位從而損害市場競爭。This kind of price discrimination may hurt competition by giving favored customers an edge in the market that has nothing to do with the superior efficiency of those customers. 盡管如此，有差別的市場價格從總體上來說是合法的，特別是當(dāng)它們反映了和不同的購買者進(jìn)行交易所產(chǎn)生的交易成本差異時，或者它們是由于一銷售商付出試圖與他的競爭者在價格與服務(wù)上保持一致的努力而引起的。
Price discrimination also might be used as a predatory pricing tactic -- setting prices below cost to certain customers -- to harm competition at the supplier’s level. Antitrust authorities use the same standards applied to predatory pricing claims under the Sherman Act and the FTC Act to evaluate allegations of price discrimination used for this purpose.
價格歧視也可能被作為一種掠奪性定價策略來使用，（如對某些特定的消費者索取低于成本的價格）并對供貨商層面的競爭造成損害。反托拉斯當(dāng)局對適用于謝爾曼法和聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會法規(guī)制下的掠奪性定價的指控采同一標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 以評估關(guān)于此類價格歧視行為的抗辯。
Frequently Asked Questions
常見問題
Q: The gasoline stations in my area have increased their prices the same amount and at the same time. Is that price-fixing?
A: A uniform simultaneous price increase could be the result of price fixing, but it also could be the result of independent business responses to market conditions. For example, if conditions in the international oil markets result in an increase in the price of crude oil, there could be a ripple effect. Local gasoline stations may respond to the wholesale price of gasoline by increasing their prices to cover their higher costs. However, if there is evidence that the operators of the gasoline stations talked to each other about increasing prices, it may be an antitrust violation.
問：本地區(qū)的加油站在同一時間將油價統(tǒng)一提高了相同的幅度，這是否屬限價行為呢？
答：同時發(fā)生的價格同步上漲可能是市場主體限價的結(jié)果，但也可能是由于各市場主體對市場形勢的變化做出的各自獨立的商業(yè)反應(yīng)。例如，國際石油市場環(huán)境的變化可能導(dǎo)致原油價格的上漲，這亦會引發(fā)連鎖反應(yīng)。當(dāng)?shù)氐募佑驼究赡軙䦟εl(fā)價格的變化做出相應(yīng)的反應(yīng)以彌補其經(jīng)營成本的提高。但是，若有證據(jù)表明加油站的經(jīng)營者對有關(guān)提價事項進(jìn)行了協(xié)商并達(dá)成一致，這可能就違反了反托拉斯法的規(guī)定。
Q: Shopping for a stereo loudspeaker made by Sound Corporation, I couldn’t find a dealer who would sell it for less than the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. Isn’t that price-fixing?
A: The key is evidence of an agreement. If the manufacturer and a dealer entered into an agreement on a resale price or minimum price, that would be a price-fixing violation. The agreement could be formal, through a contract, or informal, when the dealer’s compliance is coerced. However, if the manufacturer has established a policy that its dealers should not sell below a minimum price level, and the dealers have independently decided to follow that policy, there is no violation.
問：在購買Sound公司生產(chǎn)的立體聲音響時，我找不到任何一家愿以低于制造商建議零售價格銷售的代理商，這是否構(gòu)成限價呢？
答：此問題的核心在于有無協(xié)定的證據(jù)，如果制造商和代理商對轉(zhuǎn)售價格或最低價格達(dá)成了一個協(xié)定，那么這就是一種違法的限價行為。這種協(xié)定可能是以合同的形式正式鑒定的，當(dāng)代理商們對這種協(xié)定價格的服從是被強制的時候，協(xié)定也可能是非正式的。但是，制造商即便是制訂了代理商不得在低于最低價格的水平上銷售的政策，只要代理商仍可自主地決定自己是否貫徹這種政策時，這種限價便是合法的。
Q: The medication my doctor prescribed for my heart condition is available from only one manufacturer, and the price is very high. Is that a monopoly?
A: If the manufacturer achieved a monopoly by acquiring a competitor or obtaining a patent by fraud, its monopoly may be illegal. If the only reason for the lack of competition is that no one else has developed a suitable alternative medication, the monopoly probably is legal. Many pharmaceutical products are protected by patents, which give the manufacturer the right to be the only producer of the product until the patent expires. That gives the manufacturer a legally acquired monopoly during the life of the patent. The antitrust laws accommodate the goal of the patent laws to encourage innovation: They prevent other firms from reaping the benefits of the invention before the inventor is rewarded for the risk and cost of the innovation.
Often, an alternative drug, made by another company, can be prescribed for a particular condition. If those companies decided to merge, or if one tried to buy the other’s patent, that would be illegal, especially if the situation resulted in a substantial lessening of competition.
問：我的醫(yī)生為我的心臟病開的一些處方藥在市場上只有一家制藥商可提供，而且價格高昂，這是否構(gòu)成壟斷？
答：如果這家制藥商是通過兼并競爭者或以欺騙性的手段獲取專利而達(dá)到市場壟斷地位的，那便是非法的。如果市場上的這種缺乏競爭的狀態(tài)是由于市場上沒有一家其它的制藥商可以提供替代性的藥品，那么這種壟斷便是合法的。制藥商的產(chǎn)品可能是受專利權(quán)保護(hù)的，法律賦予其在專利保護(hù)期內(nèi)獨家生產(chǎn)專利藥品的權(quán)力。這使制藥商在專利期內(nèi)得以合法地壟斷市場。反托拉斯法在這點上和專利法協(xié)調(diào)一致以鼓勵技術(shù)革新，他們排除了其它公司在新產(chǎn)品開發(fā)者在其所承受的開發(fā)風(fēng)險和開發(fā)成本獲得回報之前從此項革新中受益的可能性。
通常，在另一家公司生產(chǎn)出適用于某種病癥的替代性藥品后。若這些處于同一市場領(lǐng)域的公司決定合并，或其中之一試圖購買另一家的專利權(quán)，那便是非法的。尤其是當(dāng)這種合并將導(dǎo)致實質(zhì)性弱化競爭的情形時。
Q: My town has given an exclusive franchise to one firm to provide all trash-collection services. I think I could get a better price from another hauler. Isn’t the franchise restraining competition?
A: Although the town’s decision to grant an exclusive franchise prevents competition in trash collection, it probably is within the municipal powers granted by the state. If so, the town is immune from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine, which says that the antitrust laws are not meant to apply to the actions of a state.
問：我居住的小鎮(zhèn)對一家垃圾收集公司進(jìn)行特別授權(quán)，使其壟斷了本地區(qū)的垃圾收集業(yè)務(wù)。但我想我可以從其它同類公司處獲得價格更為優(yōu)惠的服務(wù)。這種特別授權(quán)是否限制了市場競爭？
答：雖然小鎮(zhèn)對該公司的特別授權(quán)妨礙了當(dāng)?shù)乩占袌龅母偁�，但這可能是政府賦予小鎮(zhèn)的地方自治權(quán)的一部分。倘若如此，小鎮(zhèn)實施的政府授權(quán)下的行為就不受反托拉斯法的規(guī)制，也就是說，反托拉斯法不適用于政府行為。
Q: I own a small jewelry store and the manufacturer of TimeCo brand watches recently dropped me as a dealer. I’m sure it’s because my competitors complained that I sell below the suggested retail price. The explanation was the manufacturer’s policy: its products should not be sold below the suggested retail price, and dealers who do not comply are subject to termination. Is it legal for the manufacturer to dictate my prices?
A: The law allows a manufacturer to have a policy that its dealers should sell a product above a certain minimum price, and to terminate dealers that do not honor that policy. Manufacturers may choose to adopt this kind of policy because it encourages dealers to provide full customer service and prevents other dealers, who may not provide full service, from taking away customers and "free riding" on the services provided by other dealers. If TimeCo got you to agree to maintain the suggested retail price, it would be illegal. It also would be illegal if TimeCo agreed with your competitors to drop you as a dealer to help maintain a price to which they had agreed. However, a complaint from a competing retailer is not sufficient to prove such an agreement, because the manufacturer may have decided independently that its interests were better served by sticking with its policy.
問：我擁有一家小珠寶行，TimeCo牌手表的制造商最近取消了我的代理商資格。我確信這是由于我的競爭者向制造商投訴我以低于制造商建議的零售價格銷售手表。制造商給出的解釋是：它的廠品不得以低于建議零售價格銷售，不服從規(guī)定的代理商將會被終止代理權(quán)。制造商強行規(guī)定我的售價是合法的嗎？
答：法律允許制造商制訂關(guān)于其代理商應(yīng)在某一最低價格水平之上銷售其廠品的政策。同時允許制造商終止不遵守此政策的代理商的代理權(quán)。制造商極可能采用這種政策，因為它將促使代理商向消費者提供全面的服務(wù)，并防止那些不愿提供全面服務(wù)的代理商搶走消費者及從其它代理商提供的全面服務(wù)中 “搭便車”。如果TimeCo公司強迫你接受其建議的零售價格，就是非法的；如果TimeCo公司與你的競爭者合謀將你逐出市場以維持他們的協(xié)議價格，也是非法的。. However, a complaint from a competing retailer is not sufficient to prove such an agreement,因為制造商可能已認(rèn)定堅持最低限價政策可使其獲得更好的收益。
Q: I own a retail clothing store and the Brand Company refuses to sell me any of its line of clothes. These clothes are very popular in my area, so this policy is hurting my business. Isn’t it illegal for Brand to refuse to sell to me?
A: It could be illegal if the refusal to sell is based on an agreement between Brand and your competitors. Without an agreement, the antitrust laws allow manufacturers substantial leeway in selecting the dealers with whom they deal. Indeed, manufacturers select dealers for a variety of reasons, including a preference for those who carry a full line of their products, the desire to maintain a certain "image" for the product line, or the ability to maintain a minimum volume of business to minimize distribution costs. The antitrust laws do not interfere with business decisions like these as long as the manufacturer acts unilaterally and not as part of a scheme to monopolize a market.
問：我擁有一家服裝零售店，Brand公司拒絕將其生產(chǎn)的一系列服裝出售給我。這些服裝在本地區(qū)甚為暢銷，所以Brand公司的政策損害了我的經(jīng)營。Brand公司拒絕向我出售其廠品的行為是非法的嗎？
答：倘若這種拒絕是基于Brand公司和你的競爭者所簽署的協(xié)定，那它就是非法的。若不存在協(xié)定，反托拉斯法允許制造商有實質(zhì)性區(qū)別地選擇其愿意與之交易的代理商。事實上，制造商在選擇其代理商時是出于多方面考慮的：包括對代理其全系列產(chǎn)品的代理商情有獨鐘；或是為了保持某一系列產(chǎn)品的市場形象；保持最低限度銷售以使銷售成本最小化的能力。只要制造商的行動是單方面的且不是壟斷市場計劃的一部分，反托拉斯法就不會干涉企業(yè)所做出的此類商業(yè)決定。
Q: I operate two stores that sell recorded music. My business is being ruined by giant discount store chains that sell their products for less than my wholesale cost. I thought there were laws against price discrimination, but I can’t afford the legal fees to fight the big corporations. Can you help?
A: Although it appears that the discount chains are receiving their recorded music products at a lower wholesale price, it may be because it costs a manufacturer less, on a per-unit basis, to deal with large volume customers. If so, the manufacturer may have a "cost justification" defense to the differential pricing and the policy would not violate the Robinson-Patman Act. However, if the wholesale price differences are not justified on the basis of cost or other differences, and retail competition is being harmed to the detriment of consumers, antitrust authorities would want to know about the situation.
問：我經(jīng)營著兩家出售翻錄音樂的商店。一家大型廉價連鎖店的低于我的批發(fā)價的大幅打折銷售行為嚴(yán)重影響了我的經(jīng)營。我知道有法律規(guī)定限制此類價格歧視行為，但我無力支付與大公司進(jìn)行訴訟所必需的訴訟費用，你們能幫助我嗎？
答：雖然，從表面上看起來這家廉價連鎖店是以低于批發(fā)價在出售他們的翻錄音樂，但這可能是由于他實現(xiàn)了規(guī)模經(jīng)營而使單位商品的銷售成本下降�？偝杀疽嚯S之下降。倘若如此，制造商就對于其差別性的定價行為有了一個 “成本抗辯”的正當(dāng)理由，從而并不違反《魯賓遜-帕特曼法》However, if the wholesale price differences are not justified on the basis of cost or other differences, and retail competition is being harmed to the detriment of consumers, antitrust authorities would want to know about the situation.
Q: I bought a Total Motors car a few years ago, and now, when I need parts replaced, I have to get them from the TM dealer. They’re very expensive. Isn’t this illegal monopolization?
A: Distribution arrangements like this usually are permitted. TM has the exclusive right to produce TM brand parts, so it is not illegal for the company to have a monopoly for its own parts. In addition, TM’s decision to make the parts available only through its dealers wouldn’t constitute monopolization of the service market unless the dealerships were owned by TM and it appeared that the company was trying to monopolize the service market through unreasonable means. Most automobile dealerships are independently owned, but even if that were not the case, a manufacturer may have legitimate reasons for making the parts available only through its dealers. For example, it may want to ensure quality of performance by requiring the parts to be dealer installed.
問：幾年前，我買了一部Total Motors牌轎車，現(xiàn)在我需要更換一些零部件，而且不得不在TM的代理商處購買，這些零部件非常昂貴。這屬于非法壟斷嗎？
答：像這樣的銷售安排通常是被允許的。TM公司對其品牌的零配件擁有生產(chǎn)專有權(quán)。況且，TM公司通過其代理商提供零部件的決策并不會構(gòu)成服務(wù)市場的壟斷。除非，這些代理商是TM公司所擁有的，或該公司有通不正當(dāng)?shù)氖侄纹髨D壟斷市場的跡象。多數(shù)汽車代理商都是自主的，但即使情況并非如此，一汽車制造商仍可對其只通過代理商向市場提供零部件的決策擁有正當(dāng)?shù)目罐q理由。如，確保代理商給消費者提供的零部件的質(zhì)量。
Q: When I read about mergers, price-fixing, or other competition issues in the newspaper, sometimes it’s the FTC that’s in charge and sometimes it’s the Justice Department. Who decides which agency has responsibility and why?
A: With certain exceptions, the two agencies have antitrust jurisdiction in most industries. To avoid duplicating efforts, they consult before opening an investigation. Over the years, the agencies have developed expertise in particular industries or markets. For example, the FTC devotes most of its antitrust resources to segments of the economy where consumer spending is high: health care, pharmaceuticals, other professional services, food, energy, and certain high-tech industries like computer technology, video programming and cable television. The FTC also is involved in preserving competition in defense industries, to save taxpayer dollars on acquisitions costs.
Some anticompetitive practices -- such as hard-core price fixing -- are prosecuted as criminal violations under the Sherman Act. That’s handled by the Justice Department because it is a function of the Executive Branch of the government. The Justice Department also has sole antitrust jurisdiction over certain matters that are subject to special industry regulation by other agencies, such as the telephone industry and other telecommunications matters, railroads and airlines.
Finally, only the FTC can challenge certain practices that are beyond the reach of the other antitrust laws -- practices that "violate the spirit" but not the exact letter of the other laws.
問：當(dāng)我在報紙上讀到合并、限價或其它有關(guān)競爭的問題時，有時候是聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會在負(fù)責(zé)，有時候卻是司法部，那么由誰來確定哪個機構(gòu)對某一具體案件負(fù)責(zé)，原因是什么？
答：除了一些特別的例外情形，這兩個機構(gòu)在大部分產(chǎn)業(yè)領(lǐng)域擁有反托拉斯司法權(quán)。但為了避免重復(fù)的調(diào)查努力，他們在展開一項調(diào)查時通常會事先互相照會。多年來，兩個機構(gòu)已形成各自專業(yè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)或市場領(lǐng)域。如，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會將其大部分的反托拉斯資源用于消費者花費較大的經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域，諸如：衛(wèi)生保健、醫(yī)藥、其它專業(yè)性勞務(wù)、食品、能源以及一些像計算機，視頻節(jié)目、有線電視等高科技的產(chǎn)業(yè)。聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會還對保持國防工業(yè)領(lǐng)域的競爭負(fù)責(zé)，以節(jié)省納稅人的稅賦。
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