[ 趙慶慶譯 ]——(2005-2-27) / 已閱53057次
The antitrust laws, however, give a manufacturer latitude to adopt a policy regarding a desired level of resale prices and to deal only with retailers who independently decide to follow that policy. A manufacturer also is permitted to stop dealing with a retailer who breaches the manufacturer’s resale price maintenance policy. That is, the manufacturer can adopt the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis.
反托拉斯法充許制造商在一定的價(jià)格浮動(dòng)范圍內(nèi)采用其所意愿的最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格政策，及只與可獨(dú)立貫徹該政策的零售商交易。制造商同樣也被允許有權(quán)終止與違反其轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持政策的零售商的交易。That is, the manufacturer can adopt the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Agreements on maximum resale prices are evaluated under the "rule of reason" standard because in some situations these agreements can benefit consumers by preventing dealers from charging a non-competitive price.
最高轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格協(xié)定則是用 “理性原則”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來評(píng)價(jià)的。因?yàn)椋谀承┣樾沃�，此類協(xié)定可以防止代理商索取非競爭性價(jià)格，從而使消費(fèi)者受益。
Non-price agreements between a manufacturer and a dealer. Manufacturer-imposed limitations on how or where a dealer may sell a product, e.g., service obligations or territorial limitations, are generally not illegal. These agreements may result in greater sales efforts and better service in the dealer’s assigned area, and more competition with other brands. Some non-price restraints may be anticompetitive. For example, an exclusive dealing arrangement may prevent other manufacturers from obtaining enough access to sales outlets to be truly competitive. Or it might be a way for manufacturers to stop competing so hard against each other. Take the case against the two principal manufacturers of pumps for fire trucks. It involved agreements that required their customers, the fire truck manufacturers, to buy pumps only from the manufacturer that was already supplying them. That meant that neither pump manufacturer had to fear competition from the other.
制造商和代理商間的非價(jià)格協(xié)定。制造商對(duì)代理商怎樣及在哪銷售其廠品做出了限制，如服務(wù)職責(zé)或地域限制。這些行為通常是合法的。因?yàn)檫@些協(xié)定可能產(chǎn)生更大銷售業(yè)績、促使各代理商在各自分配的地區(qū)提供更好的服務(wù)以及與其它品牌進(jìn)行更多的競爭等正效應(yīng)。但也有一些非價(jià)格限制協(xié)定也可能是反競爭性的。例如，一項(xiàng)嚴(yán)格控制的交易安排可能會(huì)阻止其它制造商取得真正的競爭性市場所應(yīng)有的充足的銷售渠道�；蛘�，這種協(xié)定成為了制造商們停止對(duì)任何競爭者都不利的激烈競爭的一種手段。有案例如下，市場上兩家為消防車生產(chǎn)水泵的主要制造商達(dá)成了這樣一個(gè)協(xié)定：要求他們的消費(fèi)者即消防車制造商只能從他們各自現(xiàn)有的供貨商那購買水泵。這意味著兩家水泵制造商中的任何一家都不必?fù)?dān)心來自另一家的競爭威脅。
Tie-in sales. The sale of one product on condition that a customer purchase a second product, which the customer may not want or can buy elsewhere at a lower price, is a tie-in. Requirements like these are illegal if they harm competition. A recent example: The FTC charged a pharmaceutical manufacturer with tying the sale of clozapine, an antipsychotic drug, to a blood testing and monitoring service.
搭售。某一商品的銷售以強(qiáng)制要求消費(fèi)者購買另一種他可能并不需要或在別處可以更低廉的價(jià)格購得的商品的行為稱為搭售。諸如此類的要求若是損害了競爭則是非法的。在一新近的案例中：聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)對(duì)一家藥品生產(chǎn)商的一種藥名為clozapine 用于血液監(jiān)測(cè)的安定藥品的銷售提出了搭售指控
Maintaining or Creating a Monopoly
維持和引發(fā)壟斷
While it is not illegal to have a monopoly position in a market, the antitrust laws make it unlawful to maintain or attempt to create a monopoly through tactics that either unreasonably exclude firms from the market or significantly impair their ability to compete. A single firm may commit a violation through its unilateral actions, or a violation may result if a group of firms work together to monopolize a market.
縱然，在市場上擁有壟斷地位本身并不違法。但反托拉斯法卻認(rèn)定通過將其它競爭者排除與市場之外或顯著地?fù)p害他們的競爭能力等戰(zhàn)略性手段維持或謀取壟斷地位的行為是非法的。單個(gè)公司可能因其單方面行為而違反反托拉斯法的規(guī)定；同樣，縱多的企業(yè)則可因他們壟斷市場合作行為而違法。
A common complaint is that some companies try to monopolize a market through "predatory" or below-cost pricing. This can drive out smaller firms that cannot compete at those prices. But the lower prices a large retailer offers may simply reflect efficiencies from spreading overhead costs over a larger volume of sales. Because the antitrust laws encourage competition that leads to low prices, courts and antitrust authorities challenge predatory activities only when they will lead to higher prices.
一種常見的申訴是一些公司通過掠奪性定價(jià)或傾銷價(jià)企圖壟斷市場。這可以擠出那些無力在此價(jià)格下進(jìn)行競爭的小公司。但是縱多零售商提供的的低價(jià)可能僅僅是反映出因大規(guī)模銷售而分散成本的功效。由于反托拉斯法是鼓勵(lì)因競爭而產(chǎn)生低價(jià)格的，所以法院和反托拉斯當(dāng)局只對(duì)引起高價(jià)的掠奪性定價(jià)行為進(jìn)行規(guī)制。
While the FTC has not found predatory pricing violations in recent years, it examines potential violations very carefully and maintains a close watch for other kinds of tactics -- like raising competitors’ costs -- that may disadvantage rivals.
盡管聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)近年來并未發(fā)現(xiàn)有關(guān)掠奪性定價(jià)的違法行為。但它仍然是非常謹(jǐn)慎地調(diào)查潛在的違法行為，并對(duì)其它類型的謀取市場壟斷地位戰(zhàn)略性行為保持高度的警惕。例如，可能對(duì)競爭對(duì)手不利的提高競爭者的成本的行為。
Special situations
特殊情形。
The solicitation of price fixing -- also called an "invitation to collude" -- indicates an inclination to engage in illegal behavior, but usually is not unlawful under the Sherman Act. Section 5 of the FTC Act provides more flexibility to challenge this kind of undesirable behavior.
限價(jià)引誘，又稱為 “串謀邀請(qǐng)”，反映了市場競爭者從事某一非法行為的傾向，但根據(jù)《謝爾曼法》這通常并不構(gòu)成非法�！堵�(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)法》第5條對(duì)此類不受歡迎的行為也只是做出了靈活性的規(guī)定。
Mergers
合并
The United States is in the midst of a "merger wave." The number of mergers reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act rose from 1,529 in 1991 to a record 3,702 in 1997 -- a 142 percent jump. During this period, the FTC successfully challenged a host of potential mergers, saving consumers millions of dollars that they otherwise would have paid in higher prices. Identifying and challenging anticompetitive mergers is a difficult task that can take thousands of hours of investigative work and often, litigation.
美國目前正處于企業(yè)合并的大潮之中。在Hart-Scott-Rodino法規(guī)制之下的合并案記錄已從1991年的1529宗上升到1997年3702宗，上升了142個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。在此期間，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)成功地阻止了大量潛在的合并，為消費(fèi)者挽回了可能因支付更高的價(jià)格而引起的數(shù)百萬美元的損失。鑒別和規(guī)制反競爭性的合并是一項(xiàng)十分艱巨的工作，它可能要花費(fèi)大量的調(diào)查時(shí)間并經(jīng)歷多次的訴訟。
Most mergers actually benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more efficiently. But some are likely to lessen competition. That, in turn, can lead to higher prices, reduced availability of goods or services, lower quality of products, and less innovation. Indeed, some mergers create a concentrated market, while others enable a single firm to raise prices.
多數(shù)合并實(shí)際上因其使公司的運(yùn)營更富有效率而使市場競爭和消費(fèi)者受益。但也存在一些可能弱化競爭的合并。這種合并多導(dǎo)致高價(jià)格；商品和服務(wù)的效用或廠品的質(zhì)量的降低；及技術(shù)革新遲緩。實(shí)際情況是，一些合并形成了一集中的市場，其它的則只是使個(gè)別公司提高價(jià)格。
In a concentrated market, there are only a few firms. The danger is that they may find it easier to lessen competition by colluding. For example, they may agree on the prices they will charge consumers. The collusion could be in an explicit agreement, or in a more subtle form -- known as tacit coordination or coordinated interaction. Firms may prefer to cooperate tacitly rather than explicitly because tacit agreements are more difficult to detect, and some explicit agreements may be subject to criminal prosecution.
在一個(gè)集中的市場上，只有少數(shù)的幾家公司。此類市場的威脅在于這些少數(shù)的幾家公司可能發(fā)現(xiàn)通過串謀來限制競爭是很容易的。如，他們可能在對(duì)消費(fèi)者索取的價(jià)格上達(dá)成一致。這種串謀可以是一個(gè)很明顯的協(xié)定，也可能是以較為隱蔽的方式。較知名的方式有tacit coordination or coordinated interaction 較之鑒定明顯的協(xié)定，公司可能更傾向于采用沉默式的合作，因?yàn)槟镜膮f(xié)定通常很難被發(fā)現(xiàn)，況且一些公開的協(xié)定還可能會(huì)遭受刑事指控。
When a merger enables a single firm to increase prices without coordinating with its competitors, it has created a unilateral effect. A firm might be able to increase prices unilaterally if it has a large enough share of the market, if the merger removes its closest competitor, and if the other firms in the market can’t provide substantial competition.
當(dāng)一項(xiàng)合并使個(gè)別公司在沒有與其競爭者協(xié)調(diào)的情況下提價(jià)，這只是會(huì)產(chǎn)生單方面的影響。倘若一家公司擁有足夠大的市場份額，倘若其合并排擠了最主要的市場競爭者，倘若市場上其它的公司無法與之進(jìn)行實(shí)質(zhì)性的競爭，那么該公司就可能有能力單方面地提高價(jià)格。
Generally, at least two conditions are necessary for a merger to have a likely anticompetitive effect: The market must be substantially concentrated after the merger; and it must be difficult for new firms to enter the market in the near term and provide effective competition. The reason for the second condition is that firms are less likely to raise prices to anticompetitive levels if it is fairly easy for new competitors to enter the market and drive prices down.
總的來說，一項(xiàng)可能有反競爭性影響的合并至少應(yīng)包含兩個(gè)條件：市場在合并后極可能是充分集中的；這種市場對(duì)于一家新的公司來說，其在早期是很難進(jìn)入市場并提供有效競爭。第二個(gè)條件的原因是：倘若一家新的公司可以平等地且很容易地進(jìn)入市場，從而使價(jià)格降低，那么市場上原有的公司將價(jià)格提高到一個(gè)限制競爭的水平的可能性就很小。
Under these conditions, one of three basic kinds of mergers might facilitate coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive behavior: horizontal mergers, which involve two competitors; vertical mergers, which involve firms in a buyer-seller relationship; and potential competition -- or conglomerate mergers -- in which one of the firms is likely to enter the market and become a potential competitor of the other.
在這些條件下，one of three basic kinds of mergers might facilitate coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive behavior:兩個(gè)競爭者之間的橫向合并；相互間有買賣關(guān)系的幾家公司間的縱向合并；以及潛在競爭-- or conglomerate mergers – 即一家公司試圖進(jìn)入某一市場，他就成了市場上原有公司的潛在競爭者。
Horizontal mergers
橫向合并
In a horizontal merger, the acquisition of a competitor could increase market concentration and increase the likelihood of collusion. The elimination of head-to-head competition between two leading firms may result in unilateral anticompetitive effects.
在橫向合并中，市場競爭者可獲得的是提高市場的集中程度及增加串謀的可能性。消除兩家處于市場中領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的公司間勢(shì)均力敵的競爭可能導(dǎo)致單方面的反競爭效應(yīng)。
Witness the recent attempt by Staples, Inc., one "superstore" retailer of office supplies, to acquire Office Depot, another giant retailer of office supplies. In many areas of the country, the merger would have reduced the number of superstore competitors, often leaving Staples as the only superstore in the area. Evidence from the companies’ pricing data showed that Staples would have been able to keep prices up to 13 percent higher after the merger than without the merger. The FTC blocked the merger, saving consumers an estimated $1.1 billion over five years.
有證據(jù)表明，辦公用品零售業(yè)巨頭Staples公司近來試圖與另一同領(lǐng)域巨人Office Depot公司合并。該合并案將在整個(gè)國家的多數(shù)地區(qū)減少同領(lǐng)域競爭者的數(shù)量，使得Staples公司公司成為本地區(qū)唯一的經(jīng)營辦公用品的超級(jí)市場。有關(guān)來自于公司定價(jià)數(shù)據(jù)的證據(jù)表明，合并后Staples公司可以將市場價(jià)格提高13％。聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)阻止了此合并案，在過去的五年中為消費(fèi)者大約節(jié)省了11億元的費(fèi)用。
Vertical mergers
縱向合并
Vertical mergers involve firms in a buyer-seller relationship -- a manufacturer merging with a supplier of component products, or a manufacturer merging with a distributor of its products. A vertical merger can harm competition by making it difficult for competitors to gain access to an important component product or to an important channel of distribution. This is called a "vertical foreclosure" or "bottleneck" problem.
縱向合并是相互間存在買賣關(guān)系的公司間的合并。如一制造商與其零配件供應(yīng)者間的合并，或與其產(chǎn)品銷售商間的合并�？v向合并加大了其它市場競爭者獲取零配件或市場銷售渠道的難度，從而對(duì)市場競爭造成了損害。這通常被稱為 “縱向排斥”或 “瓶頸”問題。
Take the merger of Time Warner, Inc., producers of HBO and other video programming, and Turner Corp., producers of CNN, TBS, and other programming. The FTC was concerned that Time Warner could refuse to sell popular video programming to competitors of cable TV companies owned or affiliated with Time Warner or Turner -- or offer to sell the programming at discriminatory rates. That would allow Time Warner-Tuner affiliate cable companies to maintain monopolies against competitors like Direct Broadcast Satellite and new wireless cable technologies. What’s more, the Time Warner-Turner affiliates could hurt competition in the production of video programming by refusing to carry programming produced by competitors of both Time Warner and Turner. The FTC allowed the merger, but prohibited discriminatory access terms at both levels to prevent anticompetitive effects.
在Time Warner（HBO與一些其它視頻節(jié)目的制片人）與Turner Corp（CNN，TBS和一些其它節(jié)目的制片人）的合并案中，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)關(guān)注的是Time Warner可以拒絕向有線電視公司所有或附屬的且與Time Warner或Turner Corp有競爭關(guān)系的公司銷售流行的視頻節(jié)目。抑或Time Warner可以以歧視性的價(jià)格銷售。這便可使得Time Warner或Turner Corp附屬的有線電視公司可以在市場上保持壟斷地位，并抵制像Direct Broadcast Satellite 和 new wireless cable technologies這樣的競爭者。況且，Time Warner-Turner還可以拒絕傳送兩家公司的競爭者所制作發(fā)行的節(jié)目，這便對(duì)視頻產(chǎn)品節(jié)目市場的競爭造成了損害。雖然，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)批準(zhǔn)了本合并案，但其禁止了有關(guān)歧視性條款以防產(chǎn)生反競爭性的后果。
Potential competition mergers
潛在競爭合并
A potential competition merger is the acquisition of a company that is planning to enter a market and compete with the acquiring company (or vice versa). It results in the elimination of a potential competitor. That can be harmful in two ways. For one thing, it can prevent the increased competition that would result from the firm’s entry. For another, a firm can have a procompetitive effect on a market simply by being recognized as a possible entrant. The reason? The firms already in the market will avoid raising prices to levels that would make the outside firm’s entry more likely. The elimination of the potential entrant through a merger would remove the threat of entry and make anticompetitive pricing a real possibility.
A potential competition merger is the acquisition of a company that is planning to enter a market and compete with the acquiring company (or vice versa). 它的后果是排除了一個(gè)潛在的市場競爭者。此類合并在兩個(gè)方面顯示出了它的危害性：一方面，它妨害了因一家新公司進(jìn)入市場而引起的市場競爭加�。涣硪环矫�，a firm can have a procompetitive effect on a market simply by being recognized as a possible entrant. 原因是什么呢？市場上原來的公司總是避免將價(jià)格提高到令場外公司更有可能進(jìn)入的水平。通過合并來排除潛在的市場進(jìn)入者將會(huì)消除一新進(jìn)入市場的競爭者所帶來的威脅，同時(shí)使反競爭性的定價(jià)行為成為可能。
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